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INTRODUCTION
During her remarkable career on the Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor articulated principles, in both concurrence and dissent, which moved
to the doctrinal core of multiple areas of jurisprudence.1 Perhaps, just perhaps,
Justice O'Connor has done it again. In Lawrence v. Texas,2 although the Court's
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I appreciate helpful comments from Matt Coles, Chai
Feldblum, Susan Herman, Minna Kotkin, and the editors of this journal.
1. Justice O'Connor's dissent in City ofAkron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
453 (1983), argued for adoption of an "undue burden" standard, rather than strict scrutiny, as the basis for
judicial review of restrictions on women's choice to have an abortion. The Court adopted that standard in
Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992). Her argument in
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), that government should not display
religious symbols in such a way as to communicate endorsement of the beliefs of one group of citizens,
became the dominant theme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence after Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Her defense in dissent of the sovereign authorities of states in
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 777 (1982), had commanded a majority by the time she wrote the
opinion of the Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Reflecting on this extraordinary
impact, Professor Kathleen Sullivan has described Justice O'Connor as "the most influential woman in
American history." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Justice in the Balance, WASH. POST BOOK WORLD, Dec. 25,
2005, at BW03 (review of JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: How THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE
SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL (2005)).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodomy law, ruling that the state had no legitimate
interest in criminalizing private, consensual sexual relations between two adults).
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majority decided the case on substantive due process grounds,3 O'Connor
concurred relying solely on the Equal Protection Clause.4 Because future
litigation on sexuality and gender issues is more likely to turn on issues of
equality (or expression) than on issues of privacy,5 her concurrence may
ultimately achieve the influence of many of her past minority opinions. And
because its reach exceeds the bounds of any specific classification, O'Connor's
concurrence in Lawrence may set the terms for equal protection analysis in cases
involving a broad range of social groups.
Sexual privacy and equality law have been on a roller-coaster ride through the
Court's jurisprudence. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld a Georgia
sodomy law on the grounds that privacy doctrine did not include a right to sexual
conduct and that moral disapprobation of homosexuality constituted a legitimate
state interest.6 The effect was to authorize a "presumptive criminal" status for
lesbian and gay Americans.7 In Romer v. Evans,8 the Court invalidated a
Colorado state constitutional amendment that singled out gay people for disfavor
in the process for enacting civil rights protections; it did so without addressing
the seeming conflict with Hardwick. By reversing Hardwick and eliminating the
presumptive criminal status, Lawrence unlocked the door to full application of
Romer, with its recognition of equal protection rights for gay people. However,
just as the Romer opinion failed to engage with Hardwick, the Lawrence majority
does not discuss the Romer decision.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence, though joined by no other
Justice, sought to provide a coherent account of the Court's gay rights jurisprudence.
Although O'Connor's unwillingness to join the Lawrence majority in recognizing a
liberty right to private consensual sexual conduct pushed her into an Equal Protection
concurrence, 9 her opinion is likely to exercise considerable pull. Romer is the only
opinion in which the full Court has tackled equal protection issues regarding sexual
orientation. The Court's opaqueness makes O'Connor's attempt at explication through
her Lawrence concurrence especially helpful.
Most important is Justice O'Connor's explanation of a heightened rational basis test
under equal protection doctrine. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Romer, like
his opinion in Lawrence, did not directly identify the standard of review that the Court
was using in its analysis. In both cases, the Court used language associated with rational
3. Id. at 574-75.
4. Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
5. See Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MIcH. L. REv.
1528, 1542-52 (2004).
6. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, 191-92, 196 (1986).
7. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy
Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000).
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
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basis review,1° but invalidated laws that likely would have withstood scrutiny under the
traditionally deferential rational basis standard.1 ' The result was both coy and
frustrating, leaving lower courts to guess what guidance was intended. 12 While it seems
obvious that the Court is trying to create space for contentious cultural battles to evolve
into their own resolutions with minimal judicial intervention, this strategy also creates
the risk of confirming precisely what the Court presumably wants most to avoid: the
appearance of purely outcome-driven results, unconstrained by clear rules of the game.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lawrence attempts to explain the emerging law of
heightened rational basis review and to articulate a standard that lower courts can apply.
It is too soon to know whether her approach will gain traction and support within the
judiciary; that outcome may be less likely to occur given her departure from the Court.
However, Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence could supply at least the
starting point for an equal protection framework which would be applicable to all
"new" socially visible minorities whose emergence postdates the enactment of federal
civil rights laws. Moreover, it would clear up a murky zone of constitutional law that
pre-dates the LGBT line of cases.
This essay seeks to place the O'Connor concurrence in perspective. Her
opinion in Lawrence elucidates a standard which already operates, but does so
erratically. The Court has refused to acknowledge the heightened rational basis
10. Id. at 578 (the Texas sodomy law "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual"); Romer 517 U.S. at 635 (the Court could
not "discern a relationship to legitimate state interests"). References to "legitimate state interest" are
often associated with rational basis review. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (whether "there is a
rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose"). In
my view, however, Lawrence is far more complex than a simple rational basis review case. In it, the Court
protects the liberty interest in private consensual conduct with a stringency equivalent to what it uses in
the field of reproductive choice issues, where infringements on personal liberty are closely examined. See
Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1103, 1113-23 (2004) [hereinafter Hunter,
Living With Lawrence].
11. Under the traditional rational basis standard, legislative classifications have "a strong presumption
of validity." Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Unlike the stricter forms of scrutiny accorded to
classifications that the Court has found to be intrinsically suspect, rational basis review is "the most
relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny." Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989). A court need
only find that
there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the legislative facts on which the
classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the
government decisionmaker, and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
12. Judge Richard Posner noted that "'rationality'... is not in fact a single standard, though the courts
have been coy about admitting this." Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752,
768 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., dissenting). In Urban Believers, several churches challenged the validity
of a Chicago zoning ordinance, asserting that it unlawfully burdened religious exercise. Judge Posner
dissented on the ground that plaintiffs' equal protection rights were violated and cited City of Cleburne
for the proposition that in "sensitive" cases "judges are ... more alert for unjustifiable discrimination
than in the usual case ... " Id. Judge Posner went on to cite both Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas as
support for "the proposition that discrimination against sensitive uses is to be given more careful,
realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts" than normal zoning classifications. Id. at 769.
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standard, instead using it as a kind of constitutional "gimme" when none of the
other tiers of equal protection law quite hits the target. On this understanding,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence represents not so much an epiphany as a
somewhat sketchy map.
Part I argues that LGBT equality cases force courts into a political discomfort zone,
shaped by the knowledge that federal legislative remedies for discrimination have
become a standard response to successful social movements and by the simultaneous
uncertainty about whether LGBT people will achieve that goal or not. The uncertainty
creates a different political environment than the one surrounding civil rights lawsuits
that were litigated in the decade after Brown v. Board of Education,13 before legislative
relief became a politically viable option. In law, this discomfort zone produces what I
call a constitutional interregnum. Part II examines the substance of Justice O'Connor's
heightened rational basis standard, placing it in the context of prior cases that have
accorded significant bite to rational basis. '4 1 draw on briefs and correspondence among
the Justices to compare LGBT rights cases to earlier equal protection puzzles. Using
previously unavailable papers of the Justices, I find a particularly strong resonance with
the status of sex discrimination cases in the early 1970's. Part Ill examines the
contemporary judicial response to Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Part IV critiques
O'Connor's approach, and offers a restatement of her standard in fuller terms. I return
to the concept of interregnum and analyze how it relates to judicial legitimacy.
I. MAKING DOCTRINE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERREGNUM
At its core, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence tackles the
most enduring institutional dilemma of the American judiciary: the tension
between its extraordinary power to invalidate laws adopted by democratic
processes and its duty to protect minorities from abusive policies. The Supreme
Court's history tells us that it is most likely to deploy the former in service of the
latter when public opinion supports such action, when other centers of state
power have signaled the political viability of intervention, and when contrary
political forces occupy outlier, or at least minority, status.1 5 Those criteria were
present to support the Court's ruling in Lawrence, but they do not exist as a base
for invalidating at least some other anti-gay discriminatory practices, beyond
13. 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
14. The bite metaphor originated more than 30 years ago, in the first law review article to identify
heightened rational basis as an operating principle in equal protection law. See Gerald Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
ForA Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972).
15. Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MicH. L. REv. 431, 440-45
(2005). Even Justice "Frankfurter later conceded that he would have voted to uphold public school
segregation in the 1940s because 'public opinion had not then crystallized against it."' Id. at 443. My own
suggestions about the tipping point impact of other centers of state power can be found in Nan D. Hunter,
Federal Courts, State Courts and Civil Rights: Judicial Power and Politics, 92 GEo. L.J. 941, 979
(2004).
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criminalization of consensual adult sexual relations. 16
Moreover, after having found that the use of certain characteristics in
legislation triggers a higher than rational basis review,'7 the Court has suspended
its willingness to recognize additional classifications as suspect. In City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,' 8 the Court essentially froze the
identification of any additional social groups for that status, even one as distant
from the cultural wars as the mentally retarded:
[T]he appropriate method of reaching ... instances [of invidious
discrimination] is not to create a new quasi-suspect classification
and subject all governmental action based on that classification
to more searching evaluation. Rather, we should look to the
likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular
classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the
specifics of the case before us.19
Instead, the Court relied on an unarticulated, pragmatic compromise to balance
the two competing horns of its institutional dilemma: it reversed a lower court
decision that authorized heightened scrutiny of legislative actions affecting the
group, but it simultaneously struck down a discriminatory policy.
20
Five years after Cleburne, Congress rendered the Court's analysis essentially
moot for retarded or otherwise disabled persons, by adopting the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).2' The ADA enacted sweeping anti-discrimination
commands, reaching many more organizational entities, with a much deeper
regulator37 bite, than the Court could have produced in Cleburne under any equal
protection analysis.2 2 As a result, challenges to disability-based discrimination
are routinely brought under the statute, and there is virtually no equal protection
case law precedent on classifications based on disability.
The trajectory for disability rights law followed what has become the
popularized narrative of progress for civil rights: social minorities use the
litigation of constitutional claims as one of the early strategies for legal reform. If
the litigation produces some victories and, especially, greater visibility and
political traction, that success fuels the movement's demands for more change,
16. Klarman, supra note 15, at 443.
17. The Supreme Court has applied elevated scrutiny to legislative classifications on the basis of
national origin, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); race, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U. S. 184, 191-92 (1964); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); sex, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); and illegitimacy, Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988).
18. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
19. Id. at 446.
20. Id. at 432.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12181 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-169).
22. Unlike the Constitution, the ADA has a detailed text. It applies to private as well as public actors,
§§ 12111, 12181 (definitions under employment and definition of private entity); and covers disparate
impact as well as disparate treatment discrimination. §§ 12112, 12182 (employment and public
accommodation provisions).
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which can lead to first state, and then federal civil rights legislation.23 Under this
familiar model, a kind of legal-political interregnum exists between the early
phase of judicial and local legislative victories, and the culmination in the
enactment of broad federal statutes.
From the perspective of judges concerned about the institutional role of the
courts, the interregnum creates a period of political trial and error, requiring as
much statesmanship as craftsmanship.24 In the dance between politics and law,
the role of judges becomes predictive as well as evaluative. Courts become a
testing ground, a venue for assessing whether a particular equality claim is
worthy. One way in which that assessment is expressed is whether recognition of
a group's demand is justified by analogy to the claims that have already been
established as valid.
Judicial precedent furnishes the explicit benchmark for validity of a legal
claim. But an implicit benchmark exists as well. Because of the American
experience that politically successful equal protection claims eventually produce
national anti-discrimination statutes, another unacknowledged, but perhaps more
important, metric also operates. It is difficult to imagine that judges do not ask
themselves, perhaps unconsciously, whether an analogy offered by a "new"
minority fits those arguments which were eventually validated by legislative
imprimatur. If so, constitutional equal protection arguments succeed or fail based
in part on an assessment of whether they are likely to succeed politically.
Operating in this discursive environment, once a group achieves a cultural
toehold through its construction as a legible social minority, it still faces a
complex challenge in the legal arena. Advocates must satisfy doctrinally-
imbedded criteria for justifying judicial intervention, which include showing that
the legislature used the group's identity to fashion an invidious and even
irrational discriminatory classification. The underlying principle which they
deploy is the need to correct faulty legislative processes.
At the same time, however, the realm of litigation includes a discursive
backbeat which asks a very different question: how similar is this new
situation to past examples of equality claims that we now consider legitimate,
in part because they gained majoritarian support? Or, to put it more bluntly,
from a judge's perspective: how likely is it that an equal protection ruling in
favor of this group today will be legitimated by majority acceptance of the
group in the future? Should a court intervene to countermand democratically
authorized classifications without a sense that such change is likely? Or, is
23. Historical accounts of the social process of litigation on behalf of minorities include PATRICIA A.
CAIN, RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND CouRTs IN THE LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (2000); DAVID J. GARow, LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING
OF ROE v. WADE (1994); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements
and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001).
24. I owe this felicitous phrase to Andy Koppelman.
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intervention when no change is foreseen all the more justified?
During an interregnum, the most important doctrinal question is the standard
of review for the classification in question. The standard of review establishes the
framework under which a social group will, or will not, emerge from the
wilderness as a culturally legitimate minority. Bumping the standard of review
upward signals the growing legitimacy of the group. Perhaps one reason why the
Court has not stood forthrightly behind its adjustments in the rational basis
standard is a sense that recognizing such a shift requires too much of a political
commitment by a Court which clearly aspires to minimalism, at least insofar as
equal protection is concerned.25 If so, then O'Connor's standard is all the more
appealing, because its low entry point of political unpopularity communicates
nothing about the intrinsic worthiness of the group or the appropriateness of the
classification.26
The LGBT civil rights movement poses exactly these dilemmas for today's
judiciary. How then should the Court treat this minority-and indeed other
minorities occupying the same position in the future-during an interregnum, the
period after meaningful social and political support has accrued for their claims,
but before they have achieved the muscle necessary to enact reforms in national
majoritarian fora? That is, I believe, the fundamental question that Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence addresses.
For LGBT Americans, the primary legal question until Lawrence v. Texas was
whether they could be prosecuted as criminals for the sexual conduct that marked
the borders of the group. The full Court's opinion in Lawrence effectively
decriminalized homosexuality.27 But although LGBT people are no longer
presumptive criminals, they are also not yet presumed fully innocent in a cultural
sense. Acceptance of homosexuality as a benign variation is increasing rapidly,
but in many quarters, it is still marked as deviant. LGBT people have achieved
legal, but not social, innocence. Even open discrimination against them is often
not "recognized [as] invidious[] ' '28 in the uncontested way that it is against
persons of color or women or adherents of non-dominant religions.
Justice O'Connor has demonstrated an acute sensitivity to the political nuances
of equality in American society. She has written critically important decisions
regarding both race and sex discrimination.29 Until Lawrence, however, she had
25. Cf Jed Rubenfeld, TheAnti-Anti-DiscriminationAgenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002) (arguing that
an opposition to extensions of anti-discrimination principles is the unifying thread in the Supreme Court's
recent trends in constitutional interpretation).
26. See infra Part IV(A)(1).
27. In fact, as I and many others have argued, conflating a form of sexual conduct with a group identity
was a grave error. Using historical analysis, the Supreme Court in Lawrence corrected the conflation error
that was made in Hardwick. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567-72 (2003). Nonetheless, sodomy laws
continue to have a social meaning that is often synonymous with homosexuality.
28. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,460 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
29. Important decisions in politically sensitive race discrimination cases include Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding university affirmative action plan designed to achieve diversity in the
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never written an opinion in a sexual orientation case. Her concurrence reflects the
same kind of pragmatic insight into the political zeitgeist on sexual orientation
issues that she brought to other equality issues.
II. HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence is a relatively brief
exegesis on equal protection law. Of course, it is impossible to know her goals in
writing it. On a more ambitious reading, however, it reshapes Footnote 4 in
United States v. Carolene Products,3° which set the terms for all forms of
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. At a minimum, it is an
attempt by a member of the Court to re-invigorate analysis of the particular
circumstances that give the rational basis test meaningful punch.
A. STATING THE O'CONNOR STANDARD
Lawrence v. Texas involved a Texas statute which criminalized oral or anal
sexual conduct when the participants were two persons of the same sex, but not
when a male-female couple engaged in the same acts. Five Justices invalidated
the Texas sodomy law on the ground that petitioners' "right to liberty under the
Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government., 31 Justice O'Connor concurred in the result, but
relied only on the Equal Protection Clause.
The key to O'Connor's analysis is the distinction she drew between her
approach and the typical inquiry of whether a statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. She acknowledged that "laws such as economic or tax
legislation ... normally pass muster" 32 under the traditional test, invoking the
judiciary's reliance on "the democratic processes" to correct wrongheaded policy
choices. "[H]owever," she declared, "some objectives, such as 'a bare... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group,' are not legitimate state interests.,
33
O'Connor's innovation was to move away from examination of the character-
istics of the group, which traditionally formed the basis for a finding of suspect
status. Indeed, O'Connor never even mentioned, much less analogized to, the
classifications which have led to two tiers of heightened scrutiny in equal
protection law. The substitute trigger for O'Connor is legislative motivation:
student body); and Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (ruling that government's
use of race-based classifications to benefit minorities must meet a strict scrutiny standard). O'Connor's
sex discrimination opinions include Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(striking down the exclusion of men from a nursing program). She has also exercised extraordinary
influence on the issue of abortion. See sources cited supra note 1.
30. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In Carolene Products, the Court upheld federal regulation of a dairy
product believed to be unhealthy. In Footnote 4, the Court recognized that more stringent scrutiny was
appropriate for legislation infringing on personal liberty, rather than economic interests.
31. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
32. Id. at 579.
33. Id. at 580 (citing Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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"When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we
have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such
laws under the Equal Protection Clause.",34
O'Connor found that, by singling out same-sex conduct for criminal prohibi-
tion, Texas "[made] homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law.",35 As a
consequence, discrimination against them in areas unrelated to criminal law, such
as employment or family law, was more likely.36 "Texas' sodomy law brands all
homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be
treated in the same manner as everyone else.",
37
The only state interest that Texas offered as justification for the statute was the
promotion of morality.38 Distinguishing Hardwick, which upheld promotion of
morality as a legitimate basis for prohibiting sodomy as conduct, O'Connor
wrote that the same principle did not apply when the state prohibited conduct for
only one group. 39 "Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the
group, is ... insufficient" as a rational state interest.40 "We have never held that
moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient
rationale ... to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons.' The
Equal Protection Clause prohibits classifications "'drawn for the purpose of
disadvantaging the [particular] group."' 42
O'Connor's concurrence identifies a boundary between moral disapprobation
of conduct, which she would accept if applied evenhandedly, and the moral
disapproval of groups of persons, which she found illegitimate. It is an
admonition to "hate the sin, but don't be unfair in punishing the sinners."
Punishing only some of the sinners reveals that a group of persons, not allegedly
immoral conduct, is the real target of opprobrium. Legal instantiation of such
scapegoating constitutes de jure stratification among Americans, in effect
creating second-class citizens. As the Court wrote in Romer, quoting the first
Justice Harlan, "the Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.' ' 43
O'Connor closed her opinion with a caveat: under heightened rational basis
review, other laws distinguishing between homosexuals and heterosexuals could
be upheld.44 A state that could show a legitimate interest-not moral disapproval
of homosexuality-behind its law could succeed in preserving a classification
34. Id.
35. Id. at 581.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 582.
39. Id. at 583.
40. ld. at 582.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 583 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)).
43. Romer 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
44. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585.
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based on sexual orientation. O'Connor strongly suggested that excluding
same-sex couples from marriage and excluding openly gay persons from the
military could be based on reasons other than "mere disapproval of an excluded
group. 45
Extrapolating from this opinion, one can derive the O'Connor standard for
heightened rational basis. The blackletter test is straightforward: whether a
particular classification demonstrates animus toward a politically unpopular
group. To reach a conclusion on this inquiry, courts would ask three subsidiary
questions:
• Is the disadvantaged group politically unpopular?
" Can the court reasonably infer that animus (either a desire to
harm or moral disapproval) toward this group infected the
adoption or application of the law?
* Can the defending state actor demonstrate that a rational
reason or legitimate policy objective, other than animus,
actually motivated the challenged classification?
A possible additional factor would be the substantive importance of the
deprivation or penalty. Although an amicus brief filed by constitutional law
professors suggested this as a central aspect of heightened rational basis,46
O'Connor apparently did not agree. O'Connor stated that the Court was most
likely to ratchet up the rational basis test in cases involving "personal
relationships, 47 but she did not incorporate an assessment of the nature of the
substantive interest into her proposed new standard. Thus, in her conceptualiza-
tion, the nature of the interest apparently serves a predictive function, but is not
central to the reasoning.
As it stands, the O'Connor standard is too skimpy to be more than barely
workable. The Lawrence concurrence, however, does create a platform that
future courts could use to build out more fully a new wing of constitutional law. It
is not difficult to imagine an elaborated version of heightened rational basis
joining the other tiers of equal protection analysis in future case law and
- 48treatises.
B. THE CONTEXT FOR O'CONNOR: FOOTNOTE 4.1?
Just as the Court balked at extending suspect status-applied to racial
classifications-to classifications based on sex,4 9 the Court is now clearly
45. Id.
46. Brief for Constitutional Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 135139 at *8-10.
47. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580.
48. See infra Part IV(B).
49. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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unwilling to equate sexual orientation classifications with either race or sex. The
Court eventually produced a category of intermediate scrutiny to be applied to
classifications based on sex,50 and today, it seems to be using increasingly
stringent rational basis review for sexual orientation. In doing so, the Court draws
on a kind of conceptual fallback which it has used before on scattered
occasions. 5 For various reasons, however, the classifications that have drawn
heightened rational basis in the past did not produce repeated litigation in the
Supreme Court.52 LGBT equality issues may persist, without federal statutory
redress, for a longer period of time. If so, the alignment of this shadowy standard
with an active social movement may bring heightened rational basis out of the
constitutional closet.
The O'Connor standard builds more directly on Romer v. Evans than on any
other case. Like O'Connor in Lawrence, the majority in Romer invoked
Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno53 for the principle that a "bare... desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.'54 Unlike the O'Connor concurrence, however, the Romer opinion did
not acknowledge that it was applying anything other than the traditional rational
basis test, finding that the Colorado provision at issue "fails, indeed defies" even
that lenient standard.
The Romer Court's unwillingness to own the gap between its result and the
ease with which most legislative classifications meet a rational basis test was a
routine target of criticism. 56 The Court has had a history of resorting to an
unarticulated level of rationality in cases which have involved politically
unpopular groups, despite the protests of dissenting Justices. 7 O'Connor's
concurrence, however, is the first time a Justice has responded to the criticism
with a positive proposal forged in the context of sexual orientation cases, a
50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
51. In the 25 years prior to Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down legislative classifications
using what was purportedly a rational basis test in 10 cases, while upholding classifications under that
standard in 100 cases. Richard C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from
the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. RaV. 357, 370 (1999).
52. In sex discrimination cases, only five years separated the heightened rational basis analysis of
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and the Court's formal acknowledgment of intermediate scrutiny in
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Litigation regarding disability-based discrimination has
proceeded primarily under the Americans with Disabilities Act since its enactment. See supra text
accompanying notes 21-22. The communal living arrangements (other than extended families) protected
in Moreno have largely disappeared.
53. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (finding a provision of the Food Stamp Act barring eligibility for households
containing unrelated persons to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause).
54. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
55. Id. at 632.
56. While themselves defending the Court's decision in Romer, Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry
noted that "[a]mong legal scholars .... it has mostly engendered puzzlement." Daniel Farber & Suzanna
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. CoMMENT. 257, 257 (1996).
57. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); see
also infra text accompanying notes 59-67.
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cultural flashpoint for the current Court.
In the past, Justices from opposite ideological ends of the Court have chafed
when the majority applied rational basis with real bite. Justice Scalia's dissent in
Romer criticized the majority for ignoring case law establishing that minimal
scrutiny should have been applied and that it permits imperfectly tailored
classifications. 58 Then-Justice Rehnquist made the same point almost 25 years
earlier in his dissent in Moreno, in which the Court invalidated a congressional
prohibition on providing food stamps to unrelated members of a household, in an
attempt to cut off assistance to groups of hippies. 59 From a starkly different
philosophical standpoint, Justice Douglas implicitly joined the Rehnquist critique
in Moreno. Douglas believed that the restriction was invalid as a violation of
associational rights. Absent that defect, however, Douglas concluded that under
rational basis review, the statute "might well be sustained as a means to prevent
fraud. ' ' 60 In Cleburne, the Court struck down a zoning ordinance requirement of
special permits for group homes occupied by mentally retarded persons,
professing that it was applying only the traditional rational basis standard. Justice
Marshall, dissenting in part, wrote that he could not accept the Court's disclaimer
of a more exacting standard: "[H]owever labeled, the rational basis test invoked
1161today is most assuredly not the [traditional] rational-basis test ....
The same dynamic of unacknowledged heightened scrutiny and protests of
inconsistency occurred even more dramatically in Plyler v. Doe.62 The Plyer
Court invalidated a Texas law that barred undocumented alien children from its
public schools, assertedly using a rational basis standard of review that merely
"[took] into account" the social costs of the law.6 3 Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court prompted concurring opinions from Justices Blackmun, who argued
that the overbreadth in the classification was "fatally imprecise" because of the
"extraordinary nature of the interest involved," 64 and Justice Powell, who
concluded that "denial of education to these children bears no substantial relation
to any substantial state interest., 65 A four-Justice dissent accused the majority of
"spin[ning] out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of this case." 66
Underlying this entire debate is Footnote 4 from United States v. Carolene
Products, Co., in which the Court, referring to religious, national, and racial
minorities, noted that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
58. Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 542.
61. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
62. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
63. Id. at 223-24.
64. Id. at 236.
65. Id. at 239.
66. Id. at 244.
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for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.",67 Since Carolene, the
Court's indicia for strict or heightened scrutiny have turned on two broad
categories of factors: intrinsic characteristics of the group, such as its history of
discrimination and the capacity of its members to engage in the activity from
which they are being excluded;6 8 and the political position constructed for the
group by the reactions of others to it, i.e. its political powerlessness.69
The O'Connor standard would examine only the political status of a
group-its political unpopularity-and none of its other characteristics. Because
political unpopularity changes with time, one imagines that at least some groups
could move in and out of eligibility for heightened rational basis review.
O'Connor's vision is of a more dynamic equal protection review than that alluded
to in Footnote 4. She would accord significant flexibility and discretion to
legislators for utilizing a variety of classifications, while also permitting, on a
case-by-case basis, a potentially lethal form of review to apply outside the
categories of race, religion, national origin, and gender.
C. WRESTLING WITH INDETERMINACY
As we have seen, the Court has struggled in the past with whether and when to
apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on certain characteristics. A
closer examination of two critical historical points-Frontiero v. Richardson
70
and the Cleburne case-reveals that using a stricter standard than traditional
rational basis, but not declaring it to be different, creates instability and
uncertainty. The story of Frontiero resonates especially strongly with the current
positioning of LGBT equality claims, because both the attorneys and the Justices
struggled to define whether some form of heightened scrutiny had already been
accepted for sex-based classifications.7' In Cleburne, decided a dozen years later,
Justice O'Connor herself participated in debates over a possible extension of
heightened scrutiny.
Two years before Frontiero, in Reed v. Reed, the Court had unanimously
struck down an Idaho law that required preference for appointment of male
rather than female administrators of estates, when more than one candidate
was equally eligible for appointment under the statutory categories.72 The
Court did not state what level of review it was applying, but used language
that, like the language in Romer and Lawrence,73 suggested that a rational
67. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
68. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 686 (1973).
69. Id. at 686; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-44. In addition, when a fundamental right is at stake, the
Court will examine any differential access to it with strict scrutiny. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). In some cases involving apparently rational basis review, the Court also appears to be swayed by
the nature of the interest. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
70. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 79-86, 90-95.
72. 404 U.S. 71(1971).
73. See cases cited supra note 10.
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basis test was being used.7 4 The following year, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, Justice
Brennan again used similar language whenhe referred to the Court's decision
in Reed as a conclusion that the Idaho statute "fail[ed] to satisfy even the
more lenient equal protection standard."
75
Frontiero followed as the next sex discrimination case decided by the Court. It
involved a federal statute which allowed male, but not female, married service
members to automatically receive additional benefits for the "dependency" of
their spouse.7 6 In the three briefs which she filed with the Court,77 American Civil
Liberties Union attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg repeatedly stressed the need for
clarification of the muddy language in Reed.
In Frontiero, a three-judge district court had upheld the statute, finding in part
that it "would be remiss" to apply heightened scrutiny in light of the Reed
language. 8 Citing Justice Brennan's description of Reed as meaning only that the
Idaho law was too irrational to meet the lowest level of review, Ginsburg
criticized the district court's analysis, asserting that the Supreme "Court's
reservation of the standard question for another day was misread as a mandate to
lower courts to apply a lenient test... . Similarly, her brief argued that "the
question of the stringency of review was left open" in Reed.80
Ginsburg argued that the lower courts, interpreting the Reed language to signal
the use of only traditional rational basis review, were misguided, and other courts
were confused. Her brief cited eighteen lower court decisions in post-Reed sex
discrimination cases," some in which the courts "regard[ed] Reed as a major
precedent marking a new direction in judicial review of sex-based classifica-
tions" 82 and others evincing "'lenient' review.",83 In all, the outcome of the
challenges aligned perfectly with how the court had characterized the standard of
review. 84 Slyly discounting the plausibility of the inference that traditional
74. "The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants...
bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by [the challenged statutes]." Reed,
404 U.S. at 76. The Court concluded that Idaho's law violated the Equal Protection Clause because it provided
"dissimilar treatment for men and women who are... similarly situated." Id. at 77.
75. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972). This language is reminiscent of the Court's
statement in Romer v. Evans that the Colorado provision at issue there "fails, indeed defies" even a
rational basis standard. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
76. Frontiero v. Laird, 411 U.S. 677,678 (1973).
77. Frontiero v. Laird, Jurisdictional Statement [hereinafter Frontiero Jurisdictional Statement]; Brief
for American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Frontiero v. Laird, 411 U.S.
677 (1973) (No. 71-1694) [hereinafter Frontiero Brief]; Joint Reply Brief of Appellants and American
Civil Liberties Union Amicus Curiae, Frontiero v. Laird, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694) [hereinafter
Frontiero Reply Brief]. Ginsburg also presented oral argument. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678.
78. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 206 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
79. Frontiero Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 77, at 10.
80. Frontiero Brief, supra note 77, at 31.
81. Id. at 32-33.
82. Id at 32.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Id.
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rational basis was the correct guideline, she wrote that "[s]ome courts have even seen in
Reed implicit rejection of a strict standard of review... .,,85 "[Diesignation of the sex
criterion as suspect," she wrote in her reply brief, was "overdue."86
What emerged from the Court in Frontiero was a plurality decision written by Justice
Brennan finding that strict scrutiny should apply to sex-based classifications. There was
no fifth vote for that holding, however. Justice Stewart concurred stating only that the
military's policy violated the principle of Reed.87 Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, also concurred, specifically rejecting strict
scrutiny and citing Reed as "abundan[t] support[]" for the judgment.88
Justice Blacknun's papers, recently released to the public, contain copies of the
correspondence among the Justices as they considered whether to recognize sex as a
suspect classification. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell were
concerned about interference with the ratification process for the Equal Rights
Amendment, which at that time had been adopted by Congress and was under debate in
state legislatures.8 9 However, the case also prompted a lively debate among the Justices
over what they had in fact done in Reed and how equal protection standards should be
developed.
Justice White, who ultimately joined Brennan in finding sex to be a suspect
classification, wrote to Brennan:
I think Reed v. Reed applied more than a rational basis test ....
If moving beyond the lesser test means that there is a suspect
classification, then Reed has already determined that .... Whether
it follows from the existence of a suspect classification that
'compelling interest' is the equal protection standard is another
matter .... [W]e actually have a spectrum of standards. Rather
than talking of a compelling interest, it would be more accurate
to say that there will be times... that we will balance or weigh
competing interests.90
Justice Stewart apparently considered joining Brennan at one point. In a letter
to him, Stewart wanted to substitute for part of the proposed opinion a "statement
that we find that the classification effected by the statute is invidiously
discriminatory. (I should suppose that 'invidious discrimination' is an equal
protection standard to which all could repair .... y,91
Justice Powell wrote to Brennan of his concern that the Court was reaching out
to decide a question then being resolved in the context of the ERA debates. "If...
85. Id.
86. Frontiero Reply Brief, supra note 77, at 14.
87. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 691-92.
89. These Justices discussed the ERA issue in their concurrence. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 163, Folder 9, Letter from Justice White to Justice Brennan (Feb.
15, 1973) [hereinafter Blackmun Papers].
91. Id., Letter from Justice Stewart to Justice Brennan (Feb. 16, 1973) (emphasis in original).
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this Court puts 'sex' in the same category as 'race' we will have assumed a
decisional responsibility (not within the democratic process) unnecessary to the
decision of this case . ,9' Justice Brennan wrote back that he had given
Powell's letter "much thought," but
I come out however still of the view that the "suspect" approach
is the proper one and, further, that now is the time, and this is the
case, to make it clear .... Thurgood's discussion of Reed93 ...
convinces me that the only rational explication of Reed is that it
rests upon the "suspect" approach.
94
Chief Justice Burger, who wrote Reed, closed the conversation on what he no
doubt thought was a humorous note: "Some may construe Reed as supporting the
"suspect" view but I do not. The author of Reed never remotely contemplated
such a broad concept but then a lot of people sire offspring unintended!" 95
Ironically, the end result in Frontiero was to reverse the outcome of the lower
court, which had upheld the statute, but implicitly to affirm the conclusion that
rational basis was the proper standard. These two courts were engaging two
different versions of rationality. The district court had declared that any rational
justification "perceived" by the courts, whether or not proven, would suffice.9 6
Four Supreme Court Justices concurred in the judgment on the ground that
rational basis analysis required invalidating the statute, but provided no
explanation for why the military's policy failed the lowest level test.
By the time of Cleburne, the Court had essentially divided into three groups on
the question of extending heightened scrutiny beyond the categories already
recognized. These categories appear in Justice Blackmun's notes taken during the
conference sessions that the Justices held on this case.9 7 Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Rehnquist flatly opposed any other suspect classes. Justices
Brennan and Marshall wanted to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasi-
suspect class, as the lower court had done. (Justice Blackmun joined Justice
Marshall's opinion.)98 And Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor agreed that
92. Id., Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (Mar. 2, 1973).
93. The reference is to Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, in which Marshall wrote that Reed "can only be understood as [an] instance[] in which the
particularly invidious character of the classification caused the Court to pause and scrutinize with more
than traditional care the rationality of state discrimination." 411 U.S. 1, 107 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
94. Blackmun Papers, supra note 90, Letter from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell (Mar. 6, 1973).
95. Id., Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Brennan (Mar. 7, 1973).
96. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201,206 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
97. Blackmun Papers, Box 428, Folder 7, Miscellaneous Notes by Justice Blackmun, No. 84-468, City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (Mar. 20, 1985) [hereinafter Blackmun Papers, Miscellaneous
Notes, Blackmun Papers, Box 428, Folder 7, Miscellaneous Notes by Justice Blackmun, No. 84-468, City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (Apr. 26, 1985).
98. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,473 (1985).
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rational basis review was both appropriate and sufficient, but, at least according
to the Blackmun documents, did not press the need to draw a clear line ruling out
any further extensions of suspectness. 99
The Blackmun conference notes from March 20, 1985, indicate that Chief
Justice Burger's comments on the case included "no heightened scrutiny" and
"no more quasi-suspect classes."' 0° Justice White stated that he "would not create
another category for heightened scrutiny." Justice Rehnquist agreed with not
"creat[ing] any more" quasi-suspect classes; "we are awash in it." Justice
O'Connor also did "no[t] like [the] new suspect class" idea. She also noted that
she found it to be a "yvey close case."' 1
Justice Powell triggered a strong reaction when he circulated a memo among
the Justices that proposed that the Court could avoid deciding the question of
whether the recognition below of a quasi-suspect class had been correct,
reasoning that the opinion could simply refer to rational basis analysis. Justice
Rehnquist pointedly responded to Justice White, then at work on a draft of the
Court's opinion:
I would hope you would not subscribe to this idea, because it
would result in the case deciding absolutely nothing that was
not already well known before we took it. The issue presented
by the case was whether or not "heightened scrutiny" should
be employed to review equal protection claims where made
by the mentally retarded: the Court of Appeals held that it
should be, and we granted certiorari, I thought, to decide that
question. To simply "punt" and turn the case into one of five
or six hundred decisions of this Court applying rational basis
equal protection analysis to a particular ordinance would, to
my mind, rob the decision of any importance which it would
otherwise have. 102
Justice White agreed:
I see no persuasive reason for not announcing that rationality is
the governing standard. That is the issue we took this case to
decide, there is a clear majority for that standard, and not saying
so will leave in place an erroneous ... precedent .... I doubt
that we would have granted this case had it involved only
99. See generally Blackmun Papers, Miscellaneous Notes, supra note 97.
100. Blackmun Papers, Miscellaneous Notes, supra note 97, Notes by Justice Blackmun (emphasis in
original).
101. Id.
102. Id., Letter from Justice Rehnquist to Justice White (June 5, 1985).
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whether the rational basis standard had been properly ap-
plied. 103
Powell was persuaded: "I now agree that we should decide explicitly that
rational basis is the proper standard. This will be the precedent that counts."' 04
The correspondence and notes do not tell us what impact the Cleburne debates
had on Justice O'Connor. She joined Justice White's opinion early in the process,
and in the midst of the flurry of letters among the Justices, she sent a note to him
saying "I am still with you on this."' 10 5 But it seems highly likely that the Court's
unresolved struggle to clarify the criteria for equal protection standards
influenced her concurrence in Lawrence.
The historical documents from the Frontiero and Cleburne cases provide us
with a richer historical context for understanding the Court's current struggles
with the levels of equal protection review. Today we can see that the Justices
disagreed among themselves about what standards they should adopt and even
what standards they had already adopted. They debated when and how to deploy
both specificity and silence in fashioning doctrine. It is a fair reading of Romer
and Lawrence that this uncertainty-both expressive and instrumental-
continues.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE O'CONNOR OPINION
In the three years since Lawrence was decided, there has been a mixed reaction
to Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion.10 6 No court has openly adopted a
heightened rational basis test. Rather, courts invalidating anti-gay laws on equal
protection grounds have relied on what they called simply a rational basis test,
even though they have followed O'Connor's guidelines. Conversely, courts
rejecting equal protection challenges have invoked the genuinely traditional form
of rational basis review. The pattern repeats, with uncanny similarity, the actions
of federal courts hearing sex discrimination cases shortly after Reed v. Reed.
0 7
In Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning,10 8 a federal district court
103. Id., Letter from Justice White to Justice Powell (June 6, 1985).
104. Id., Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan (June 10, 1985).
105. Id., Letter from Justice O'Connor to Justice White (June 12, 1985). Her earlier letter was written
June 4, 1985.
106. In addition to cases discussed in the text, several courts have referred briefly to the O'Connor
opinion. Most have been marriage cases in which courts invoked her implied acceptance of a legitimate
state interest for excluding same-sex couples from marriage. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind.
App. 2005); Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Hemandez v. Robles,
805 N.YS.2d 354, 374 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Cf Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476, 478
(N.Y App. Div. 2005) (denying recognition to a civil union partner for purposes of wrongful death
recovery). In one marriage case, the court cited O'Connor's concurring opinion to support the rejection of
morality as a permissible state interest. Anderson v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL
1738447, at *8 (Wash. Super. 2004).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
108. 382 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.Neb. 2005).
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struck down a Nebraska state constitutional amendment which prohibited legal
recognition for the "uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union,
domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship."10 9 The court found
the amendment to be "indistinguishable" from the provision invalidated in
Romer, because of the breadth of the disability imposed on a single group and the
disjuncture between the classification and the asserted purpose of protecting
marriage. 110 The court reasoned that because the purpose of "mak[ing] this class
of people unequal, thereby disadvantaging a group" was clear from the evidence,
the Nebraska amendment was a facial violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 111
Thus, the court found that it was unnecessary to reach the O'Connor question of
"whether, once a law is found to be directed at a 'politically unpopular group,'
more searching scrutiny is required." '112
The reasoning applied in Bruning implies that the O'Connor test would be
necessary only when animus is not self-evident. However, the court found the
amendment to be motivated by animus only after close analysis of the neutral
reasons proffered by the state in its defense. As in Romer, the finding of animus
amounted to an inference drawn because of the weakness of the link between
those reasons and the text of the amendment; the court cites no direct evidence of
animus per se. Thus, although the court disclaimed reliance on heightened
rationality, it seems nonetheless to have been using it.
In State v. Limon, which invalidated a sentencing law that mandated much
longer incarceration for sexual activity between two underage partners when the
participants were the same sex than when they were of different sexes, the
Supreme Court of Kansas deployed a similar assertion-that only rational basis
review was necessary-paired with actual use of higher than normal scrutiny.
113
Despite declaring that it was "apply[ing] the rational basis test,",11 4 the court
relied almost entirely upon the equal protection cases highlighted in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Lawrence. 1 5 The court concluded that the classifica-
tion was both over- and under-inclusive as to some asserted state interests,1 16 and
that it also impermissibly relied on moral disapproval of a group.117 As was true
of the district court in Bruning, the Kansas Supreme Court simply ignored older,
more traditional rational basis analysis.
109. Id. at 985.
110. Id. at 1002.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1002 n.20 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
113. 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005).
114. Id. at 30.
115. Id. at 30-32.
116. The court found no factual support for the belief that homosexual sexual activity was more
harmful to minors than to adults, that public health justified the law, or that the law protected persons in
group homes. Id. at 35-38.
117. The court rejected state interests in expressing moral disapproval of homosexuality and in
channeling children's sexual development in traditional directions. Id. at 34-35.
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The most extensive examination of O'Connor's concurrence is found in the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and
Family Services. 118 The lower court had upheld a Florida law that barred homosexuals
from adopting children. Although the Eleventh Circuit denied en banc review of the
decision, Judges Birch and Barkett issued opinions in which they debated the meaning
of the equal protection analysis in Lawrence. The critical point of contention was
whether anything other than the most lenient form of rational basis review applied.
Judge Birch rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection argument by refusing to adjust
the traditionally most lenient type of scrutiny. In assessing the rationale behind Florida's
ban on gay persons adopting children, Judge Birch argued that the only permissible
question was "whether the Florida legislature could have reasonably believed" that the
prohibition would further the state's interest in placing adoptive children into homes
offering "optimal developmental conditions."11 9 Birch found the answer to be
self-evident:
[T]he mainstream of contemporary American family life con-
sists of heterosexual individuals. Can it be seriously contended
that an arguably rational basis does not exist for placing adoptive
children in the mainstream of American family life?... I think
not. 120
Judge Birch dismissed the O'Connor standard as unsupported by any other
opinion, 121 correctly pointing out, in what he described as his "more conventional
and measured reading" of precedent, 122 that none of the cases cited by O'Connor
had acknowledged using any standard other than regular rational basis. 123 Judge
Birch concluded that rational basis review did not require, and indeed the
Supreme Court had explicitly rejected, judicial examination of the actual
motivations behind a law. 124 Romer, he argued,
stand[s] for the proposition that when all proffered rationales for
a law are clearly and manifestly implausible, a reviewing court
may infer that animus is the only explicable basis. And animus
alone cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.12
Birch pinpointed a key difference between heightened and normal rational
basis, which is the extent to which a court will look behind what might be
118. 377 .3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
119. Id. at 1276.
120. Id. (emphasis in original).
121. Id. at 1279.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1279-81.
124. Id. at 1279.
125. Id. at 1280 (emphasis in original).
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pretextual or post hoc rationales for a classification, in order to assess the extent
to which animus played a part in the legislative process.
Judge Barkett's spirited dissent utilized the O'Connor approach but stopped
short of labeling it as a separate standard. She argued that "Florida's law fail[ed]
to survive any form of rational basis review." 126 Central to that conclusion,
however, was a heightened rational basis assessment:
[T]here is no question that a politically unpopular group is being
targeted, that the challenged legislation inhibits personal relation-
ships, and that there is no legitimate rational relationship
between Florida's proffered justifications and its sweeping
categorical adoption ban against homosexuals.1
27
Although Barkett did not acknowledge using a heightened standard, her equal
protection analysis used methodologies not associated with lenient review. She
closely examined the lack of a fit between the exclusion of gay adoptive parents
and the state's two goals: to place children with married parents to maximize the
possibility of stability in their family life, and to place them with good role
models. As to the first, she noted that the state permits unmarried heterosexuals to
adopt and criticized the assumption that gay parent homes are less stable.1 28 As to
the second, she argued that the state's willingness to allow cross-racial adoptions
or adoption by immigrant parents who cannot help children adjust to a culture
that is unfamiliar to them, indicated that the state's rationales for rejecting gay
adoptive parents were pretextual and thus that animus could be inferred. 129 In
addition to her unwillingness to accept the logic of the state's justifications at face
value, Judge Barkett relied on the extensive history of openly expressed anti-gay
prejudice during enactment of the adoption ban as proof that animus fueled the
legislation. 1
3 0
Thus in Bruning, Limon and Lofton, courts have varied in their definitions of
rational basis review when analyzing classifications based on sexual orientation.
A forthright explication of heightened rational basis would offer substantially
greater clarity in future cases.
IV. THE O'CONNOR STANDARD As PROCESS OVERSIGHT
In evaluating Justice O'Connor's formulation of heightened rational basis, it
seems only fair to do so on its own terms. It is most certainly not a new theory of
justice or equality. The most outstanding characteristic of this approach is its
126. Id. at 1296.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1297-99.
129. Id. at 1299-1300.
130. Id. at 1301-03.
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singular focus on process. What the O'Connor standard contains are those
components of heightened scrutiny which focus on the permissibility of the
governmental interest and on the degree of tailoring between a legitimate interest
and the classification. What it does not contain is any reference to characteristics
of the group beyond the requirement that it be "politically unpopular."
O'Connor's standard is an attempt, pragmatic like its author, to operationalize
the limited oversight of political processes that John Hart Ely argued was the
foundation of judicial review.1 3' Moreover, it revives what Gerald Gunther had
called "means-oriented scrutiny,"1 32 an approach that has lain dormant since his
article. Unless more specifics are added, however, this standard may turn out to
be only another of the Court's apparently random variations on traditional
rational basis review.
A. OBJECTS OF SCRUTINY
There are three possible components that could comprise a heightened rational
basis standard: criteria for the classification itself; criteria for the quality of the
legislative process; and criteria for the nature of the interest at stake. I will
analyze the O'Connor standard's treatment of each in turn.
1. The Classification Itself
"Politically unpopular" could describe tobacco company executives, lesbian
schoolteachers, or paroled child molesters. By using only this descriptor for the
group, O'Connor apparently seeks to diminish the role that group characteristics
would play in heightened rational basis analysis. Most courts would probably
take judicial notice of the political unpopularity of these three, and countless
other, groups. And while some social minorities, like LGBT people, might have
acquired meaningful political power in certain localities, even these groups,
however, could be classed as unpopular if they cannot yet compete without
controversy or stigma in national political arenas. Thus, although "politically
unpopular" is a broad and imprecise term, it is unlikely to pose significant
problems for judges applying a heightened rational basis analysis.
The requirement of unpopularity is softer than the political powerlessness to
which Footnote 4 alluded. "Unpopular" avoids the absolutism of "powerless,"
which now uncomfortably fails to describe virtually any of the groups to which
the Court has extended strict or intermediate scrutiny. The shift in language also
emphasizes the ephemeral nature of the group's social status: popularity is a
realm where change is almost expected. Even if a group's unpopularity is
extremely unlikely to change (as with child molesters, for example), the
131. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); see also Janet E. Halley, The
Politics of the Closet: Toward Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV.
915 (1989).
132. Gunther, supra note 14, at 23.
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reference to popularity is a more neutral description than what is implied by
political powerlessness, which suggests a problem of greater importance than
unpopularity and implies an unmerited penalty.
2. The Quality of the Legislative Process
Traditional rational basis analysis does not authorize close scrutiny of
legislative history in order to ascertain what the purposes of a classification
actually were at the time of enactment. 133 Nor does it entail much examination
beyond the question of surface plausibility for how closely a classification relates
to whatever legitimate purposes the legislature may have had.'34 It is on these
two questions where heightened rational basis analysis most closely resembles
strict or intermediate scrutiny.
In querying actual purpose, for example, the analysis undertaken by the Court
in Eisenstadt v. Baird135 is much closer to the detailed examination given to the
state's justifications for an all-male public military academy in United States v.
Virginia, where the Court insisted that there could be no post hoc rationale and
stressed the need for a genuinely important state interest, 36 than it is to the
traditional rational basis analysis in Federal Communications Commission v.
Beach Communications, Inc., where the Court ruled that any conceivable
legislative purpose could satisfy the rational basis test. 13 7 Similarly, the Court
refused to accept the degree of misfit between legislative goals and an anti-gay
classification that existed in the provision at issue in Romer, 38 in stark contrast to
the allowance of admittedly crude lines drawn to disadvantage persons based on
age in Vance v. Bradley139 and Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia.140
The nature and quality of the Court's examination of the sexual orientation
classification in Romer much more closely resembles the rejection of what
Justice Stevens characterized as the "not totally irrational" classification drawn
between men and women in the age requirement for purchasing beer, deployed
by the Court in its first application of intermediate scrutiny. 41 It also bears more
than passing resemblance to Justice O'Connor's analogous "undue burden"
standard for restrictions on abortion, 42 which authorizes flexible but still
meaningful review of intrusions on liberty.
133. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 333 (1993); Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see also Gunther, supra note 14, at 21.
134. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955); see also Gunther, supra note 14, at
20-21.
135. 405 U.S. 438, 448-53 (1972).
136. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
137. 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993).
138. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996).
139. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
140. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
141. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 213 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. See cases cite supra note 1.
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One problem associated with an inquiry to determine whether animus or
hostility motivated legislation, is the difficulty of identifying what any legislative
body's motivation was in enacting a particular provision. Gunther proposed a
rational basis with bite approach, which sought to avoid this difficulty by not
attempting to determine motivation. 143 Completely eschewing an inquiry into
motivation, however, would invite post hoc rationalization and pretext. Although
not every case will make for fruitful inquiry, in those situations in which evidence
of bias is present, courts should not blind themselves to a social context that
helped produce, maintain or enforce an invidious law.
Another problem with such an inquiry is the definitional question pressed by
Justice Scalia in his dissent in Lawrence, in which he argued that "preserving the
traditional institution of marriage," an interest that O'Connor was apparently
willing to accept, amounted to nothing more than a kinder phrasing of moral
disapproval of homosexuality.44 "Traditional values" are widely assumed to be
synonymous with disapproval of enhanced rights for gay people or legal
protections for gay couples.1 45 For any form of equal protection review to
provide meaningful shelter for unpopular groups, courts will have to reject the
perpetuation of tradition as a legitimate purpose, unless it is accompanied by
some other, more material state interest. Tradition may be a fine motivation in
many contexts. But the Constitution should not allow a classification of persons
to be based solely or primarily on tradition, when the classification disadvantages
a group which is already handicapped in the legislative world of pluralist
bargaining. In that situation, the risk of legislation designed to stratify for the sake
of stratification is too great.
A third problem with the legislative purpose analysis, which Justice O'Connor
did not address explicitly, is the mixed motive issue. When legislators have relied
partially on animus in their drawing of the classification, the effect of that
reliance must be balanced against any co-existent legitimate goals. The Supreme
Court has not yet been presented with such a mixture in an LGBT equality case:
Colorado relied on only non-moralistic state interests to justify the provision at
issue in Romer, 146 and Texas asserted only the promotion of morality to justify its
sodomy law. 1
47
Under heightened rational basis, the primary guideline for mixed motive
143. Gunther's proposed model asked "that the Court assess the rationality of the means in terms of
the state's purposes, rather than hypothesizing conceivable justifications on its own initiative .... A state
court's or attorney general office's description of purpose should be acceptable." Gunther, supra note 14,
at 46-47.
144. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See discussion of "'traditional family values' movement" in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH.
L. REv. 2062, 2179-81 (2001). See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J.
177 (1993).
146. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
147. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 582.
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situations appears to be the degree of meaningful review that the Romer Court
applied to the question of whether the classification fit logically with the goals
that were proffered. There, the Court decided that the size of the gap made it
impossible to accept that those proffered justifications reflected the true purpose
behind the amendment.1 48 Extrapolating from that analysis, the existence of a
legitimate state purpose at the time of enactment, which was actually served by a
particular classification, would preserve the legislation against an attack made
under a heightened rational basis standard.
It may be that the same ongoing social change which creates the underlying
conditions for a constitutional interregnum also makes legislative purpose
analysis more challenging. As a minority group gains political support, legisla-
tors may become more reluctant to candidly express bias. Under a heightened
rational basis test, legislation infected with unacknowledged prejudice could be
sustained, but only if the exclusion or classification could be shown to actually
advance legitimate policy interests unrelated to animus.
3. The Nature of the Interest at Stake
Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court was most likely to use heightened
rational basis in cases involving personal relationships. 149 But three of the four
cases she cited do not support the point. Eisenstadt v. Baird1 50 turned not on
relationship status (whether unmarried persons had a right of access to
contraceptives) so much as on the premise, later fully stated in Roe v.Wade, 151
that individuals have a fundamental right to decide whether to become a parent.
Heightened scrutiny is required of any classification that deprives some persons,
but not others, of a fundamental right. 152 The plaintiff in Cleburne was the group
home, an institutional facility, and its officers, not any identified set of persons
who would be its occupants. -53 In Romer, no personal relationships were at issue.
Colorado's Amendment 2 would have barred a wide range of anti-discrimination
laws not limited to family matters or to persons involved in relationships. 154 That
leaves Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, in which the plaintiffs were
members of the same household and did share an ongoing relationship.1 55 But
Moreno also implicates what are often viewed as among the least significant
forms of personal bonds.' 56
It is unclear why Justice O'Connor highlighted the subject matter of personal
148. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580.
150. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
151. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
152. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
153. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 n.1 (1985).
154. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
155. 413 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1973).
156. The provision at issue in Moreno "was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie
communes' from participating in the food stamp program. Id. at 534.
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relationships as a relevant factor in equal protection analysis. Precedent did not
impose that limit on possible subject matter categories. In past decisions, the
Court has analyzed the nature of other substantive interests-not just personal
relationships-as a factor in determining how closely to review legislation.157
O'Connor referred to the substantive interest only in predictive terms, and then
got the antecedents wrong, to boot.
Including consideration of the interest at stake would have some advantages,
primarily by providing even greater judicial flexibility in the application of a
heightened rational basis standard. Integrating the weight of the liberty interest
placed in jeopardy with the appropriateness of the classification, would be
consistent with the holistic approach to equal liberty embodied in the full Court's
opinion in Lawrence.158 It could serve as an additional factor for a court to
consider in deciding a close case.
But there would also be disadvantages. Evaluating the importance of an
individual's substantive right is fraught with value judgments, a direction that
Justice O'Connor might have wanted to avoid. Like Justice Stevens, a strong
proponent of a sliding scale approach to equal protection, 159 O'Connor may have
been seeking to focus the Court more consistently on the nature of the
classification. Under her version of heightened rational basis, legislation patently
fueled by animus, even having relatively insignificant consequences, could be
closely questioned.
4. Summary
The net effect of the O'Connor standard would be to produce situational
strictness, i.e. a more stringent than normal testing of the challenged classifica-
tion when there is evidence of legislative process defects. This protection could
extend to any politically unpopular group, but would not attach to the particular
classification. Instead, its applicability would depend on whether the legislation
was infected by animus, stereotype, or prejudiced assumptions, rather than being
based on genuine rationality. Conversely, courts in other cases could be expected
to uphold laws utilizing the same classification but without the baggage of such
process failures. The heightened rational basis standard would be focused on
motivation and means, and would be relatively indifferent to the interest at stake.
157. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Justice
Marshall, who repeatedly attempted to persuade other members of the Court to conceptualize equal
protection analysis as a sliding scale, also argued that the level of scrutiny should be based, in part, on the
importance of the interest which was infringed. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460-61 (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
158. See Hunter, Living with Lawrence, supra note 10, at 1134-36.
159. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451-54 (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
211-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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B. RESTATING THE O'CONNOR STANDARD
The O'Connor standard will need further elaboration in order for its potential
contribution to equality jurisprudence to be realized. Lower courts could provide
that. As federal and state judges apply Supreme Court decisions, they refine and
elaborate doctrinal tests to meet new factual scenarios. The optimal product of
such a process would be a somewhat amplified, but still simple, standard for
heightened rational basis review, preserving O'Connor's goal of applying process
oversight to the political branches. What follows is a statement of how lower
courts could elaborate O'Connor's concept of heightened rational basis.
Under a heightened rational basis standard, a court would determine whether a
classification instantiated animus toward a politically unpopular social group. To
do so, courts would use a three-pronged test.
First, courts would determine whether the disadvantaged group was politically
unpopular, either nationally or at a state or local level. A full analysis of whether
judges should consider geographic variances in political culture is beyond the
scope of this essay. Courts are accustomed, however, to accounting for both
national attitudes and corrective efforts embodied in state or local anti-
discrimination laws.' 60
Second, courts would examine the history of the legislation or regulation to
determine whether animus toward the group infected the adoption or application
of the law. This would involve consideration of legislative history and of
enforcement patterns. A finding of animus could be based on evidence of a desire
to harm the group, moral disapproval of the group, or the goal of perpetuating a
"tradition" of unequal treatment under the law.
Third, if the court found threshold evidence of animus, the burden would shift
to the defendant to demonstrate that a legitimate purpose other than animus
formed a major part of the motivation for the law, and that the classification
actually served the legitimate governmental purpose. The court should consider
any significant gap existing between the classification and the legitimate
governmental purpose to be evidence that the actual purpose behind the
classification was legislative animus.
This standard would be intended to allow effective challenges to laws which
scapegoat unpopular groups, i.e. which saddle such groups with penalties that
have only a tenuous connection to the achievement of permissible policy goals. It
would not, however, create precedent directing courts in subsequent cases to
invalidate all classifications that disadvantage those groups, if the legislation
challenged in later cases did in fact advance appropriate public policy.
C. ANTI-THEORY
The flexibility and pragmatism of Justice O'Connor's approach must surely
warm the heart of Professor Cass Sunstein, who argues in favor of minimalist
160. Cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,663-64 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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equality theory for the most culturally divisive claims, of which LGBT cases
(especially marriage claims) are the current prime example.1 61 Sunstein is the
leading exponent of a form of judicial decision making which seeks openly to
postpone and to limit the impact of rulings in politically explosive cases. Seeking
to rebut criticism that such judicial strategizing is unprincipled, Sunstein invokes
the benefits of dialogic engagement in the political branches where, ironically,
progress toward civil rights is less politically vulnerable than it is when delivered
by life-tenured judges interpreting the Constitution. 162 The courts should allow
space for that progress to occur, however slowly, he argues, by rendering
decisions that are both narrow, i.e. essentially limited to the facts of the specific
case, and shallow, i.e. reluctant to venture beyond whatever partial explication of
the meaning of equality is necessary to resolve a given dispute. 163 Sunstein
specifically lauds the Romer decision as written in a way that is both narrow and
shallow.' 64
Sunstein seeks to justify what I am calling a constitutional interregnum by
defending the separation of principles from issues of timing and means. He seems
to assume, however, an interregnum of relatively short duration. For example, he
discusses sex discrimination, noting that the Court's decision to decline strict
scrutiny in Frontiero led to intermediate scrutiny in Craig v. Boren. 165 He fails to
note, however, the extreme brevity of the sex discrimination interregnum: five
years. 166
The current interregnum is likely to last much longer (indeed, it already has).
Both the society and the federal courts are more cautious about equality today
than they were in the early 1970's. Doctrinal elasticity and incomplete theorizing
are not so much needed antidotes to excessively rapid change as they are simple
descriptions of the status quo. There seems little likelihood that federal courts,
especially, will do anything except stick to the shallow and narrow.
In this context, Justice O'Connor's proffered explication of a heightened
rational basis test actually provides some degree of structure and predictability. In
Sunstein's focus on defending minimalism as policy, he overlooks what a
contemporary, which is to say fairly enduring, interregnum would entail. If the
courts duck and bob and weave through a relatively small number of cases for a
reasonably short period of time, the content of what they decide on the way is
understood to be intentionally ephemeral, due to expire when social consensus
161. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
162. Id. at 161.
163. Id. at 10-19.
164. Id. at 141-42, 155-57, 159.
165. Id. at 168-69.
166. See supra note 52. Sunstein specifically compares Romer to Reed, arguing that both represented
"a subminimalist beginning to a set of judicial developments that go hand in hand with processes of
democratic deliberation." SUNSTIN, supra note 161, at 151. But the duration of the minimalist approach
to equal protection which is reflected in these two opinions is quite different.
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gels sufficiently to provide the necessary political support for deep and wide
equality mandates. But what if the interregnum stretches on? One can see in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence a sense that it will and that, at a minimum, the
Court has a duty to explain why the Constitution prohibits a complete free for all.
Ultimately, in its direction toward process oversight, the heightened rational
basis standard promises only that the game will have rules of some sort. As Mark
Tushnet has pointed out, judicial scrutiny which targets whether lawmakers acted
with impermissible motivations aligns with a theory of equality as non-
discrimination, or equality of opportunity, and not with a more far-reaching
theory of equality as non-subordination, or a redistributive project.' 67 Justice
O'Connor seems to be saying that, insofar as LGBT rights cases are concerned,
avoidance of consequence is the game that we in fact are playing, whatever its
virtues or limitations. Given that, it is better to adapt the rules to fit the reality of
the game, rather than to start each new inning not knowing which rules apply.
CONCLUSION
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas makes a
potentially important contribution to clarifying the role of the judiciary in
adjudicating equality claims by social minorities. Its impact would be less to alter
the substance of the law than to acknowledge it. Justice O'Connor deserves great
credit for having the intellectual honesty to attempt to articulate a coherent
standard for heightened rational basis review. Her approach would allow lower
courts to proceed with similar honesty.
What O'Connor has proposed is a measured and modest change, especially
when considered as largely an acceptance of what the Supreme Court has already
done. Its strength and weakness are the same. Because of its modesty, the
mitigating impact of the heightened rational basis standard on invidious social
hierarchy would be quite limited.
With rationality always ultimately in the eye of the beholder, courts using the
O'Connor standard would retain enormous discretion to evaluate, on a case-by-
case basis, classifications that disadvantage social minorities. The primary
change from the traditional rational basis test would be a re-setting of the starting
point of the analysis, from almost certain acceptance of the rationality of the
state's asserted interest, to skeptical engagement in the spirit of Romer and
Lawrence. Despite its shortcomings, however, the heightened rational basis
standard provides a rough but workable, partial measure of equality for this
moment of constitutional interregnum.
167. Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court's Two Principles of Equality: From Brown to 2003, in
FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME COURT: BROWN V BOARD OF EDUCATION AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 342 (Peter F. Lau ed., 2004).
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